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Wireless sensor detection is readily accessible, easily deployable, and usable technology 
that provides public-safety personnel with an early-warning and identification tool in the 
event of a Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) incident. This is 
accomplished by incorporating wireless sensor detection capability into the Los Angeles 
Fire Department’s (LAFD) hazardous-materials operations. Due to the relative ease of 
use and low cost of deployment, it makes sense that the LAFD employ wireless 
technology, capitalizing on the advantages. 
The question regarding CBRN wireless sensor network capability is whether this 
technology is suitable, reliable, user friendly, and quickly deployable. Furthermore, will 
this technology provide critical early warning, detection, and subsequent notification in 
real time? The goal of this thesis is to determine CBRN wireless sensor detection 
capability in terms of reliability, deployment, early warning, and notification. The 
objective is to outline a concept of operations document providing the need structure for 
incorporating wireless sensor detection capability into public-safety operations. 
Through field deployments and exercises using sensor detectors, standardized 
equipment, and software, the LAFD will have better access to early detection and 
notification of CBRN material releases. The end result means a more efficient, cost-
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Wireless technology has changed the way we communicate, function, and conduct 
business. This capability is finding a way into public-safety applications. The technology 
expands accessibility and productivity, introducing new opportunities, complexity, and 
challenges and making wireless networked systems and devices capable of accessing a 
wide array of equipment, resources, and information. Wireless capability has become the 
“anywhere/anytime” technology that provides the framework for the future of public 
safety operations. Delivering services effectively and efficiently is expected from our 
public in this new society that demands immediate data delivery to our fingertips in any 
way and anywhere it is needed (Federal CIO Council, 2010, p.1). For the Los Angeles 
Fire Department (LAFD) to take advantage of this technology requires the development 
of a concept of operations for wireless sensor networks (WSNs), specifically within the 
hazardous-materials domain. The LAFD hazardous-materials mission must change, 
adapt, and improvise if the organization plans to advance its operation using wireless 
sensor detection technology. 
There has been a great deal of research directed toward wireless sensor networks 
due to the rapidly growing nature of this field, its accessibility, and its interoperability 
aspects. The ability to adapt wireless sensor networks into an operational tool for public 
safety presents unique opportunities and challenges, especially when chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) sensors are concerned. The ability to take 
advantage of this technology means the ability to support LAFD hazardous-material 
operations more efficiently and safely by incorporating wireless sensor capability into the 
deployment models. Areas of concern include interoperable wireless sensor networks, 
cost, power requirements, wireless platforms, and sensor reliability.  
There have already been incidents in which wireless sensors have been deployed 
without a solid operational foundation, thus limiting their overall use and application. The 
LAFD cannot be complacent in this digital, fast-paced, increasingly wirelessly connected 




9/11 era. We must understand the capabilities and take steps to properly incorporate 
CBRN wireless sensor technology into our operations.  
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I introduces the need, research 
questions, possible solutions, and methodology used to define a concept of operations 
(ConOps) within the LAFD regarding CBRN wireless sensor detection. Chapter II 
presents the background of the various CBRN threats and hazards that guided the design 
and implementation of a possible wireless technology. This includes the background on 
LAFD hazardous-materials operations. Chapter III describes the literature and research 
documentation regarding wireless sensor networks, national strategies related to 
homeland security, and ConOps supporting real-time environmental monitoring. Chapter 
IV presents an analysis of wireless sensors networks, including the goals and objectives, 
constraints and tactics, policies and governance, and supporting organizations. The 
components, exercises, and case studies are discussed to provide deployment benefits and 
challenges. Chapter V provides the findings, which include a summary of impacts from 
an operational and organizational perspective. Chapter VI presents the recommendations, 
conclusions, and future work. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),1 including chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear materials, pose a great threat to our homeland. The National 
Security Strategy issued in March 2006 notes that there are few threats greater than a 
terrorist attack with WMD (White House, 2006, p. 18). Evidence indicates that terrorist 
organizations aspire to obtain and use chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear 
weapons. Mass-gathering locations create an attractive target for terrorists, and a WMD  
 
 
                                                 
1 In 1998, the GOA defined WMDs as any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to 
cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release of toxic or 
poisonous chemicals or their precursors, a disease organism, or radiation or radioactivity. The definition 




attack on such a gathering could have a devastating effect that could overwhelm our 
emergency-response systems. Furthermore, WMD attacks in densely populated urban 
areas could be devastating and induce chaos.  
The current LAFD model used for responding to CBRN threats incorporates a 
tremendous amount of personnel and equipment. These resource-intensive incidents are 
not efficient and result in redundant operations and an increase in response times. 
Furthermore, these types of emergencies are time consuming due to the potential hazards, 
location, set-up time, and equipment necessary to determine a safe environment. To 
further exacerbate the situation, a majority of the CBRN responses are deemed “false,” 
with no immediate threat to the public. Early and accurate detection, characterization, and 
warning of a chemical or biological event are critical to an effective response by the 
emergency-response personnel (Barrett & Goure, 2008, p.1). In the monitoring of CBRN 
threats in urban areas and in mass-gatherings scenarios, an early-warning system can 
make the difference between life and death (Barrett & Goure, 2008, p.1). In an effort to 
address the CBRN threat, the LAFD has begun using wireless sensor technology to 
provide for early warning and detection.  
The LAFD is in the initial stages of incorporating wireless sensor technology into 
its hazardous-materials procedures, but it lacks an operational doctrine to standardize the 
process. There is no architecture or overarching document that delineates wireless 
capability, the components required, or the supporting agencies necessary to meet 
mission objectives as they relate to CBRN detection. Despite using wireless sensor 
detection, the LAFD has not developed a “concept of operations” (ConOps) regarding 
their use. Without a proper ConOps, the ability to design, plan, develop, and integrate 
wireless sensor technology into the hazardous-materials operations is limited. The 
ConOps document is a prerequisite for determining the necessary goals, objectives, 





B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The fire service is faced with the realities of terrorism, as it pertains to CBRN 
threats and possible devices that could be deployed. This has influenced a change in the 
overall fire service mission. The LAFD has taken a proactive approach and is taking steps 
to advance its capability regarding wireless sensor technology in order to detect potential 
hazards and to alert authorities and the public accordingly. The LAFD is moving forward 
with a wireless sensor network and is looking to enhance existing CBRN detection 
capabilities. Along that continuum, the LAFD leadership has recognized the importance 
of promoting a functional and interoperable CBRN detection system.  
In the process of assessing the LAFD hazardous-materials operations and its 
application of a CBRN detection system, it is important to understand how to develop a 
concept of operations that addresses WSNs for CBRN detection. This leads to the 
following research questions: 
1. What concept of operations for CBRN wireless sensor networks will 
support the LAFD’s hazardous materials operations?  
 
2. What LAFD goals and objectives will enable a concept of operations for 
CBRN detection utilizing a wireless sensor network? 
 
3. What are the constraints and tactics that are associated with LAFD’s 
CBRN wireless sensor networks concept of operations? 
 
4. What policies are needed to govern the application of a concept of 
operations for LAFD’s CBRN wireless sensor networks? 
 
5. What enabling infrastructure can support a concept of operations for the 
LAFD’s Wireless Sensor Network CBRN detection plan? 
C. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
The ability to rapidly detect and identify hazardous CBRN materials equates to 
faster response times, reduced exposure potential, and more efficient use of limited 
resources. This thesis advocates the use of wireless sensor networks to become more 




materials. The traditional LAFD response models for CBRN events result in valuable 
time being used to verify the hazard and determine the nature and scope of the threat. The 
implementation of wireless detection sensors, networked together, can provide instant 
feedback on environmental conditions, prompting a more focused response and providing 
the ability to make use of specific equipment to isolate and mitigate the hazard.  
Early and accurate detection of a CBRN event is critical to a safe, well-organized 
response. An effective CBRN detection program will ensure that hazardous materials are 
rapidly detected and identified and that critical locations, events, and incidents are safely 
managed. By their nature, CBRNE2 materials differ in detection and characterization 
methodologies (United States Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 2007). With 
this new emerging capability the need for training, policy, and standardization becomes a 
necessity. By incorporating CBRN wireless sensor technology into the LAFD HazMat 
operational environment, greater situational awareness and real-time environmental 
monitoring can be achieved.  
Weapons of mass destruction pose a great threat to our communities and national 
security. As early as the 1990s, the U.S. government recognized WMD as a potential 
threat. A GAO report on combating terrorism stated that federal, state, and local officials 
generally agree that a WMD incident involving chemical agents would constitute a major 
HazMat emergency (United States Government Accountability Office [GAO], 1999, p.7). 
The report further indicated that local HazMat teams will be the first to reach the scene 
and begin actions to mitigate the hazards. Through the proper application and use of 
wireless sensors, strategically placed and remotely monitored, CBRN hazards can be 
detected and identified at levels where emergency response personnel have an advantage.  
The LAFD is operating without a clear mission as it moves forward with wireless 
sensor technology that involves CBRN detection. There is a need to develop a “concept 
                                                 
2 The Department of Defense (DoD) characterizes weapons of mass destruction in terms of chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) materials. Incidents involving CBRNE 
could range in magnitude from chemical spills that likely could be addressed by local responders to 
catastrophic incidents such as terrorist attacks involving nuclear material that could result in extraordinary 




of operations” that integrates CBRN wireless detection into the LAFD’s protocols, 
strategic assessments, and response plans, especially for mass gathering and special high-
profile events. By incorporating these factors into the operational structure, WSNs will 
propagate to other agencies and expand the awareness, capabilities, application, and 
understanding related to CBRN wireless sensor detection.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will define the framework for developing a concept of operations to 
fill the gap in the literature that relates to the application of wireless sensor networks for 
CBRN detection within the public-safety sector. In addition, important aspects of early 
warning, detection, identification, and notification will be discussed. There is ample 
documentation supporting various WSNs and describing how this technology can be 
applied to a multitude of uses involving a great number of field applications. However, 
there does not appear to be a body of literature that addresses the use of wireless sensors 
for CBRN detection within the first-responder domain. Furthermore, there appears to be a 
limited body of literature that discusses the need for real-time environmental sensor 
detection and monitoring at mass-gathering locations and venues. This thesis will discuss 
the CBRN threat, possible WSN applications within the public-safety sector, current 
program development, and different bodies of literature covering wireless sensor 
capability within the homeland security architecture. 
As the LAFD looks to the future of wireless technology, it becomes clear that the 
availability and diversification of this technology enhances the ability to respond more 
quickly, more effectively, and more safely. There is an ever-increasing need for 
ubiquitous wireless systems, which indicates the growing potential for public-safety 
agencies to seek out and evaluate new WSN applications and services. Public safety also 
needs the data capabilities and efficiencies that newer technologies can provide (House 
Homeland Security Subcommittee, 2010, p.1). Therefore, this thesis may be useful to 
other first-responding agencies that are exploring possible applications of WSN to detect 
CBRN hazards in order to improve readiness, increase response, and provide a tool for 





This thesis employed appreciative inquiry to better understand how current LAFD 
hazardous-materials plans and procedures and CBRNE-sensor network best practices can 
be used to build a framework for integrating wireless sensor capability into the LAFD 
hazardous-materials operational framework. This method was chosen because it focuses 
on discovering what has been done in the public-safety arena using CBRN wireless 
sensors, followed by what is working in other sectors. 
The LAFD has a well-defined hazardous-materials operational plan and 
emergency operational plan. These documents provide the background for developing a 
concept of operations for CBRN wireless sensor detection for the LAFD’s hazardous-
materials program.  
1. Sample 
Academic publications on wireless sensor networks, government documents from 
the Department of Homeland Security, trade journals on emerging technology, and 
LAFD operational manuals were examined for wireless sensor network best practices to 
frame a concept of operations for CBRN wireless detection. For example, the LAFD 
hazardous-materials manual helps frame the goals and objectives for CBRN wireless 
detection. The text book Wireless Sensor Networks, Technology, Protocols, and 
Application provided information on the constraints and tactics associated with wireless 
sensor networks. The National Preparedness Guidelines help establish the policies and 
governance in the area of CBRN detection. Trade journals and white papers aided in 
defining necessary components, applications, interactions, and collaboration between 
participants and stakeholders.  
Test bed information related to sensor capabilities, wireless connections, and 
notification methods was also explored, looking for trends and operational procedures 
used outside the public-safety sector that could be tailored to enhance operational 





studies, and exercises were used to better understand current applications for real-time 
hazard detection and examine how that knowledge can be applied to developing a 
concept of operations for the LAFD.  
2. Data Analysis 
The research questions helped provide the framework for analyzing the 
information available and contributed to establishing the criteria used in the data analysis. 
The objective was to analyze existing research, case studies, actual deployment 
information, and exercise evaluations to identify important elements, system 
requirements, best practices, and lessons learned necessary for developing a ConOps 





The U.S. population’s vulnerability to a CBRN attack has been highlighted by 
past activities and communicated intentions from terrorist organizations involved in 
clandestine operations looking to attack America. It is not a secret that terrorist groups 
are lying in wait attempting to coordinate another attack on U.S. soil. Since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may attempt to 
smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States or may try to use 
chemical or biological agents to attack the homeland (GAO, 2010). Terrorist groups have 
demonstrated the ability to adapt and take advantage of techniques and methods to 
produce weapons using readily available products and commodities. The greatest threats 
are posed by the most effective and simple means of mass destruction, whether these 
means consist of nuclear, biological, or other forms of asymmetric weapons (Mowatt-
Larssen, 2010, p. 7). There are numerous chemical agents that are relatively simple to 
synthesize or produce from easily obtained, over-the-counter products. These chemicals 
can be used either as dispersants, aerosolized weapons, or explosives. Preventing 
terrorists from synthesizing or obtaining small quantities of deadly chemicals or 
radiological material is a daunting task. Chemical or radiological agents in the hands of a 
terrorist could have enormous consequences in terms of casualties, fear, and economic 
loss.  
One of the responsibilities of the federal government is to assess the relative risks 
associated with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism in the 
homeland. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is tasked with assessing the 
threat levels to determine which CBRN agents present the greatest risk to the U.S. 
population sufficient to affect national security. In the Los Angeles area targets such as 
public entertainment venues (Hollywood), transportation infrastructure (LAX), and 
critical supply chains (Los Angeles and Long Beach Harbor) are vulnerable to attack. It is 
vital to appropriately capture the CBRN terrorism landscape to help prioritize resources 




A. CBRN THREAT PERSPECTIVE 
In the early 1990s, DoD officials recognized that the proliferation of chemical, 
biological, and nuclear materials that could be used to develop WMD was a growing 
threat (GAO, 2004). This perspective was confirmed by the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin 
attack in Tokyo’s subway system. The event caught the attention of the U.S. government 
and first responders, increasing concerns about our vulnerability to a terrorist attack 
involving WMD.  
Incidents such as the Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the 
Anthrax campaign in the US in 2001 show that CBRN terrorism poses a 
grave threat. According to the “Annual Threat Assessment of the US 
Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”, 
which was released in February 2010, US intelligence agencies believe 
that if Al-Qaeda can develop CBRN capabilities it will use them to attack 
Western targets. (Bharat Book Bureau, 2010) 
The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon highlighted the 
destructive potential of terrorists groups and their intentions to target the United States 
infrastructure, its economy, and its citizens. These events illustrate their intention, their 
capabilities, and their committed efforts toward disrupting the American economy. In 
2006, the United States National Security Strategy stated, “There are few greater threats 
than a terrorist’s attack with WMD.” The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security 
highlighted the continuing threat posed to the United States by the potential use of 
weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations. To that end, CBRN issues present 
a challenge for homeland security professionals. For years, senior U.S. officials and 
government reports have expressed concern that if terrorist organizations acquired 
unconventional materials, they would not hesitate to use them against U.S. friends and 
allies. The United Nation, the United States, the European Union and the G-8 all agree 
that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction represent one of the 
greatest threats to the security of all nations (Doane & DiRenzo, 2007). Since the terrorist 






explicit intention is to engage in high-profile and sophisticated attacks targeting civilians 
that include the use of CBRN together with stolen or rudimentary weapons of mass 
destruction (Campbell, 2007, p. 25). 
The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism 
completed a report entitled “World at Risk” in 2008. That report stated, “The 
Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great 
urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a 
terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.” It further pointed out that 
“terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain biological weapons than a nuclear 
weapon.” The attacks in the United States and the threat potential since 9/11, including 
the anthrax events of 2001, indicate that the threat is real.  
On October 12, a case of cutaneous anthrax was reported in New York 
City. At NBC News, a person was exposed to a letter containing a 
suspicious powder. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported 
that four recovered envelopes containing Bacillus anthracis spores were 
postmarked at the U.S. Postal Service Trenton Processing and Distribution 
Center in Hamilton Township, New Jersey. A total of 22 confirmed or 
suspect cases of anthrax infection occurred; 11 were inhalation cases, and 
11 were cutaneous cases. Five persons died. (Allegra et al., 2005) 
These types of terrible events have motivated many countries to focus their 
defense and security-related research toward the detection of explosives, hazardous 
liquids, and chemical agents that can be used by terrorist organizations as WMD threats 
against troops or civilians (Ortiz-Rivera, Pacheco-Londoño, & Hernández-Rivera, 2010). 
In an effort to provide adequate protection measures, public safety organizations in 
conjunction with federal and state agencies must develop new and innovative ways to 
address this threat.  
Unconventional weapons, including those commonly referred to as weapons of 
mass destruction, which may involve chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
agents, add a degree of complexity to defense measures. Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 18: “Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction” states that, 




agents (CBRN)—in the possession of hostile states or terrorists represent one of the 
greatest security challenges facing the United States.” The report further highlights the 
fact that “an attack utilizing WMD potentially could cause mass casualties, compromise 
critical infrastructure, adversely affect our economy, and inflict social and psychological 
damage that could negatively affect the American way of life.” (White House, 2007) 
1. Chemical Warfare Agents 
Chemical warfare agents (CWAs) are chemicals manufactured to incapacitate, 
harm, or kill. Chemical warfare agents include gases, liquids, or solids that can poison 
people, animals, and plants. The severity of the resulting injuries depends on the type of 
chemical, the amount, and the length of exposure. The principal chemical warfare agents 
are sulfur mustard (mustard gas) and nerve agents such as sarin and VX. These agents are 
typically released as a vapor or liquid. During a chemical attack, the greatest danger 
arises from breathing the vapors. If a large amount of chemical is released as an aerosol, 
the skin of humans could be exposed to the chemical agent as droplets. In addition to 
producing potentially horrific effects, chemical weapons are of great concern because 
they are cheaper and easier to manufacture than nuclear or biological weapons.  
The level of threat from terrorist attacks using CBRN varies depending on the 
chosen agent, the technical expertise of the user, and the means of delivery available to 
terrorist groups. Toxic and cyanide compounds, including hydrogen cyanide (HCN), 
cyanogen chloride (ClCN), mustard agents, nerve agents (VX), and toxic industrial 
chemicals, are considered to be the most likely choice of chemical that terrorists might 
seek to acquire . 
2. Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) include chemicals manufactured for use in 
industrial, commercial, or medical processes. TICs can be in gas, liquid, or solid form 
(including particles), but those of particular concern tend to be gases because gas spreads 




include chemical hazards such as carcinogens, reproductive hazards, and corrosives. 
They also present a physical hazard because they can be flammable, combustible, 
explosive, or reactive.  
The type of product or agent used by a terrorist can include any product that is 
capable of irritating, incapacitating, or producing lethal consequences. Common 
industrial chemicals and products, or combinations of various products, may be used, 
including chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. In a world of 
asymmetric threats, toxic industrial chemicals fit well into a terrorist’s method of attack: 
they are easily accessible, readily available, and relatively easy to convert into a weapon 
(Jakucs, 2003). 
While the most frequently used chemical warfare agents number about 70, 
approximately 70,000 TICs are produced, used and stored in large 
amounts and circulated around us by hundreds of thousands of vehicles, 
and/or they enter our environment as toxic wastes (6). Therefore, the 
likelihood of exposure to them in large amounts is relatively high. (World 
Health Organization [WHO], 1999)  
All these products present unique hazards for first responders. The ability to 
recognize them early helps to reduce casualties.  
Anhydrous ammonia and chlorine have been a concern for homeland security 
because of their unique characteristics, their ability to produce large, toxic vapor clouds, 
and their common use and availability. These products are considered toxic inhalation 
hazards, (TIH)3 and they can rapidly cover a large area at toxic concentrations. A TIH is 
a gas or volatile liquid that is known to be so toxic to humans as to pose a hazard to 
health during transportation or, in the absence of adequate data on human toxicity, is 
presumed to be toxic to humans because when tested on laboratory animals it has a 
Lethal Concentration 50 (LC50) value of not more than 5000 ppm (United States 
Department of Transportation, 2008).  
                                                 
3 Under the Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR 171–180), TIH materials are gases or liquids 
that are known or presumed on the basis of tests to be so toxic to humans as to pose a hazard to health in 




In March 2004 a plot involving Osmium Tetroxide was discovered in 
Britain. Counter-terrorism police had foiled a plot in the UK to lace a 
conventional bomb with osmium tetroxide. The chemical can damage the 
eyes, cause skin rashes, and burn the throat and lungs (2004, New 
Scientist). Osmium Tetroxide (OsO 4) serves legitimate functions in 
biological research and in specialized chemical industry, but its suitability 
as a terrorist agent—a dual-use compound—is limited, despite the 
characterizations of it generating “chemical fallout.” (Taylor & Wright, 
2004) 
The reason that TICs present a high risk is because they are readily available in 
large quantities in business, commercial, retail, and private settings. Industrial chemicals 
have become an integral part of daily life in modern societies following the industrial 
revolution that started after World War II (Hincal & Erkekoglu, 2006, p. 221). TICs can 
be used as improvised chemical weapons when combined to form other toxic chemicals. 
Chemical terrorism is typically described as a “high probability” event, and the threat 
potential of TICs cannot be underestimated (Hincal & Erkekoglu, 2006, p. 227).  
3. Improvised Chemical Devices 
An improvised chemical device (ICD) is a method that brings together the toxic 
properties of a chemical designed to release lethal toxic products in enclosed spaces, such 
as restaurants, theaters, or public transportation to induce fear or behavior modification. 
These devices have been labeled “mubtakkar,”4 a device that can deliver lethal gases. 
Such devices may be fabricated in a completely improvised manner or may be an 
improvised modification to a U.S. or foreign weapon (Finegan, 2008).  
Hydrogen cyanide, chlorine, and other TIHs are dangerous without any special 
modifications and are considered ready-made chemical agents. Although the focus has 
been on chlorine, other toxic gases and liquids have lethal chemical properties that make 
them viable agents for use in a terrorist attack.  
The men were arrested in August 2006 after officials uncovered the plot 
targeting jets departing London’s Heathrow Airport and destined for cities 
                                                 
4 This device is designed to release lethal quantities of hydrogen, cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and 




in the United States and Canada. The failed plan involved bringing on 
board homemade bombs filled with hydrogen peroxide and disguised in 
soft drink bottles, and using parts of light bulbs and chemicals hidden in 
batteries to detonate them almost simultaneously. (Faiola & Karla, 2009)  
When considering plans to deal with CBRN devices and emerging threats, 
responders need to be prepared to deal with the aftermath of such an event. This requires 
embracing technologies that can rapidly detect, recognize, and subsequently integrate 
response capabilities from multiple local, regional, state, and federal organizations and 
disciplines.  
4. Biological Threat/Hazard  
Biological agents are dispersed or employed as pathogens or toxins that cause 
disease in humans, animals, and plants. Pathogens require an incubation period to 
establish themselves in the body of the host and produce disease symptoms. The onset of 
visible symptoms may occur days or weeks after exposure. Some toxins can remain 
active for extended periods in the natural environment. This stability creates a persistent 
transfer hazard. Unlike chemical, radiological, and nuclear hazards, biological hazards 
are unpredictable, and it is difficult to classify the extent of the hazard. 
The operational considerations for biological agents include the various 
dissemination methods, such as dispersal or deposit of an aerosol, liquid droplets, or dry 
powders. Live microorganisms usually grow in a moist environment; therefore, these 
agents may be disseminated in a liquid medium as wet aerosols. However, 
microbiological materials may also be stored and released in more stable powder media. 
In general, agents dispersed as dry powder will survive longer than those dispersed as wet 
aerosols. 
Biological agents are unlike chemical and radiological agents due to the slower 
reaction time. Biological agents are not as quickly recognized and consequently 
management can be delayed because people do not become sick immediately. Most 
biological agents have an incubation period, which means that the signs and symptoms 




Radiological events, including incidents of terrorism, continue to be a real threat 
to the public and to emergency personnel. Radiation can only be detected by radiological 
detectors. Other problems associated with a radiological release include, but are not 
limited to, terrorist attack, system failure, fire, and transportation accidents.  
A radiological dispersal device (RDD) or dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such 
as dynamite, with radioactive source material, such as a powder or pellets. The explosive 
is used to blast or spread the radioactive material into the surrounding area. If an 
explosive device is used, the majority of radiological material or dust will settle within a 
relatively short time frame, leaving a larger area contaminated. Our ability to detect the 
radiation hazard requires the use of radiological detection equipment. 
6. Nuclear Threat/Hazard 
The nuclear threat is not very likely to occur; however, the severity of a nuclear 
incident depends on many factors that include weapon yield, emission spectrum, and 
distance from the initial blast. Residual radiation effects are based on the emissions from 
particles that may include alphas, beta, and low-energy gamma radiation. These sources 
are called fallout.  
B. LAFD HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OPERATIONS 
The responsibilities of the Los Angeles Fire Department for hazardous materials 
are managed and governed by regulations at the federal, state, and local levels. These 
include establishing the necessary requirements for emergency response plans, hazardous 
operations, certifications, training, and tactical configurations. The City of Los Angeles’s 
primary emergency response plan is the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations 
Master Plan and Procedures. This document is augmented by the City’s Hazardous 
Materials Annex and the fire department’s Hazardous Materials Operational Plan. The 
documents provide the foundations for HazMat operations within the city. The fire 




planning is found in the Hazardous Materials Operational Plan. These plans are designed 
to coordinate the overall response capability of the city’s departments.  
The fire department’s Hazardous Materials Operational Plan establishes the 
foundation for standard operating guidelines outlining the responsibilities of LAFD 
members tasked with the prevention, preplanning, and response to hazardous materials 
incidents. The Hazardous Materials Annex assigns responsibility for emergency response 
and coordination for dynamic hazardous materials incidents to the LAFD. The Los 
Angeles Police Department supports HazMat operations by providing force protection, 
technical expertise, and perimeter control. If there is a nexus to terrorism or criminal 
activity, the LAFD will establish a unified command with the LAPD to facilitate the 
criminal investigation. The Hazardous Materials Annex of the Emergency Operations 
Master Plan is activated when an incident grows in scope to the point where activation of 
the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is warranted. 
Emergency response or responding to emergencies means a response 
effort by employees from outside the immediate release area or by other 
designated responders (i.e., mutual aid groups, local fire departments, etc.) 
to an occurrence which results, or is likely to result, in an uncontrolled 
release of a hazardous substance. Responses to incidental releases of 
hazardous substances where the substance can be absorbed, neutralized, or 
otherwise controlled at the time of release by employees in the immediate 
release area, or by maintenance personnel are not considered to be 
emergency responses within the scope of this standard. Responses to 
releases of hazardous substances where there is no potential safety or 
health hazard (i.e., fire, explosion, or chemical exposure) are not 
considered to be emergency responses. (OSHA, 29 CFR 1910.120(q)(3)) 
The purpose of the Hazardous Materials Annex is to provide direction and 
guidance when city resources are tasked with responding to incidents involving 
hazardous materials releases and the incident has exceeded the capabilities normally 
managed at the field level. This annex includes the concept of operations for a hazardous 
material incident that may include an accidental release, an intentional release, or use of a 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) agent, or result in a 




The Hazardous Materials Operational Plan and Hazardous Materials Annex contain 
procedures and protocols to be used as guidelines for approach, recognition, containment, 
hazard assessment, and mitigation by city resources. These documents provide additional 
guidelines on monitoring and decontamination procedures for exposed personnel. 
However, with new technology being introduced into the public-safety sector, there are 
no policies or procedures that discuss wireless sensor detection.  
It is not possible to address all the hazards associated with each CBRN product 
that may be encountered by firefighters. A great deal of information relevant to hazardous 
and toxic substances in the workplace often depends on the classification of the agent and 
agency terminology. Hazardous materials, hazardous substances, and hazardous waste are 
defined and regulated in the United States through various governmental organizations 
using statutes, rules, laws, and regulations. These guidelines are administered by the 
following agencies: 
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); 
• U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); 
• U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT); and  
• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
Each agency has its own definition of what constitutes a “hazardous material,” 
based on the agency’s regulatory issues and Congressional mandates regarding their 
specific function. These terms are usually not interchangeable and often are used in the 
context of the specific agency having authority or jurisdiction. 
The Los Angeles Fire Department defines a hazardous material as “any 
chemical, chemical mixture, or contaminant which is toxic, corrosive, 
volatile, reactive, explosive, or flammable that has the capacity of 
inducing great bodily injury or illness or which has been determined to be 
capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, or property. 
Hazardous materials include all chemical, biological, and radiological 
substances, including those also referred to as Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), whether accidentally or intentionally released.” (Los 





C.  LAFD HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TASK FORCE  
The LAFD has specially trained firefighters that are assigned to one of four 
hazardous materials task forces. These task forces are responsible for performing the 
tactical operations at hazardous materials incidents. Their primary functions include but 
are not limited to: 
• Safety for responders and public; 
• Hazard identification; 
• Hazard assessment; 
• Establishing control zones; 
• Control of the hazard; 
• Decontamination procedures; 
• Notifications to key agencies; 
• Technical reference; 
• Hazard mitigation; and 
• Environmental cleanup. 
In the event of a release of a CBRN material, the operational objectives of the Los 
Angeles Fire Department’s hazardous material response team are to have technically 
trained and experienced personnel working in concert with allied agencies to stabilize and 
mitigate the release. The LAFD’s hazardous materials task forces provide technical 
assistance, specialized equipment, and detection and identification tools that help mitigate 
the incident.  
At the operational level, all firefighters have basic hazardous materials awareness 
training, and they act in a defensive fashion with readily available equipment and 
resources. They are tasked with the initial evacuation and isolation of the incident, 
containment of the release from a safe distance, limiting the spread, and preventing 
exposure to people, property, and the environment. The Los Angeles Fire Department’s 
first-responder operational objectives for a hazardous materials incident are categorized 




• Safety of first responders; 
• Evacuation; 
• Isolation; 
• Denial of entry; 
• Rapid extraction of victims; 
• Victim decontamination; 
• Medical evaluation and treatment (triage); 
• Medical transportation; and 
• Safe refuge (release and reunite). 
These activities are often performed in conjunction with other agencies, including 
the Los Angeles Police Department. The Los Angeles Police Department’s operational 
objectives for hazardous materials incident are categorized as follows: 
• Life safety; 
• Crime scene investigation; 
• Force protection; 
• Technical reference; 
• Hazardous material mitigation; and 
• Site security. 
The purpose of the LAFD notification policy is to promote prompt and accurate 
reporting to all the stakeholders, key officials, allied agencies, and response teams of a 
release or threatened release of hazardous materials that may result in injury or damage to 
the community and/or the environment. The primary reason for prompt and accurate 
notification is to enable response and authoritative agencies to take measures to mitigate 
the impacts of a hazardous materials release. This will enable the appropriate dispatching 
of emergency response teams with the appropriate equipment and personnel. It is 






contacted and that an agency representative be requested to the scene. The incident 
commander is responsible for assuring that the appropriate agencies are contacted. This 
could include any of the following agencies: 
 
• Fire Department 
• Police Department 
• California Highway Patrol 
• Federal Bureau of Investigations 
• Cal Trans 
• City Public Works Department 
 
 
• Department of Environmental 
Health 
• Department of Fish and Game 
• Department of Health Services 
• Hazardous Materials Response 
Team 
• Civil Support Teams 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review of the literature focuses on understanding what has been done in terms 
of developing a concept of operations for the integration of CBRN wireless sensor 
networks into LAFD hazardous materials (HazMat) operations. The literature examined 
helped to determine the necessary goals and objectives that would enable a concept of 
operations for CBRN detection utilizing a wireless sensor network within the LAFD. 
This included viewing the documentation to assess the constraints and tactics associated 
with CBRN wireless sensor networks. The literature was also explored to ascertain those 
policies and procedures that may be needed to govern CBRN wireless detection 
applications. Due to the variety of applications, it became necessary to look at the 
literature so as to determine the value of supporting organizations and the interactions 
among participants and stakeholders. The objective is to improve the concept of 
operations for the LAFD’s CBRN detection program by taking a multidisciplinary 
approach to wireless sensor networks.  
The literature on WSNs in support of a concept of operations for the LAFD’s 
hazardous materials program is segregated into the following categories: 
1) Documents written and established by the Los Angeles Fire Department 
provide the framework for establishing the goals and objectives to enable 
the development of a concept of operations for CBRN wireless sensor 
networks within the fire service. The source documents are the Los 
Angeles Fire Department Hazardous Materials Operational Plan and the 
Emergency Operational Plan. These documents provide the foundation for 
incident action plans, planned response, emergency procedures, 
communications, and specific competencies.  
2) Documents written by academic institutions or designed as an educational 
resource help identify the constraints and tactics associated with wireless 
sensor networks. A good source document is Wireless Sensor Networks, 
Technology, Protocols, and Applications (Sohraby, Minoli, & Znati, 
2007). This resource covers a wide range of design features and discusses 
challenges and considerations when deploying a WSN. Another resource 
is the Joint Forces Quarterly, produced by the National Defense 
University. This source is meant to inform and educate national security 
professionals on joint and integrated operations, security policy, strategy, 
guidance, and training to meet tomorrow’s challenges.  
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3) Research material by government agencies such as the Department of 
Homeland Security’s National Preparedness Guidelines. This document 
provides some guidelines regarding detection, response, and 
decontamination for CBRN incidents. Another example is material 
produced by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which discusses the 
importance of sharing information regarding sensor detection. The 
literature provides a foundation for policy and governance as it relates to 
strengthening detection capabilities for CBRN-related events. 
4) Literature from trade and professional journals provides information on 
the importance of interagency collaboration, supporting roles, and joint 
operations. For example, an article in Homeland Security Affairs titled, 
“Firefighters and Information Sharing: Smart Practice or Bad Idea?” 
focuses on the National Strategy for Homeland Security and stresses the 
importance of a formalized collaboration within the homeland security 
community. This is further emphasized in an article titled “Coordinating 
Expertise Among Emergent Groups Responding to Disasters,” where 
interactions between organizations are discussed as being essential to 
efficient coordination during emergencies (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & 
Hollingshead, 2007).  
A. LAFD OPERATIONAL MANUALS 
The LAFD’s written documentation for HazMat operations provides the 
necessary framework for ensuring a safe and efficient operation for firefighters during 
emergency incidents. These documents help define the goals and objectives that will 
enable the development of a ConOps for CBRN detection. This forms the basis for safe 
performance through proper use of equipment, apparatus, and proven practices by 
technically trained personnel working in concert with supporting agencies. 
The documentation that supports operations in a hazardous environment includes 
the Los Angeles Fire Department Hazardous Materials Operational Plan and Emergency 
Operations Master Plan and Procedures. Together, both of these documents outline and 
define the tactics and strategy needed when dealing with CBRN incidents within the city 
of Los Angeles. While these plans coordinate the overall response capability of the city’s 
departments, each department maintains its own detailed procedures (LAFD-HMOP, 
2003, p.10). A review of these documents revealed a lack of any information related to 
wireless sensor networks, their capability, application, or procedure. Between these two 
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documents, the Hazardous Materials Operational Manual provides a more thorough 
assessment of the CBRN threat, terrorism warning signs, detailed operations, and 
required action. The Emergency Operations Master Plan outlines a strategy and provides 
guidance for the fire department when dealing with significant incidents involving 
hazardous materials. Strategic planning, continuous training by a properly equipped 
workforce, and the routine exercise of response plans are all key components in assuring 
the Los Angeles Fire Department’s ultimate success in the management and control of 
emergency events (City of Los Angeles, 2010b, p. 2). Together, these documents include 
terrorism indicators, risk assessments, and control measures important for emergency 
responders when dealing with CBRN events. 
B. WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY 
Wireless technology has been around for many years and has increased in 
popularity, versatility, and capability. The available literature focuses on private industry 
and business applications that enable organizations to deliver services more efficiently, 
enhance performance, augment security, or monitor conditions. This type of information 
provides the basic understanding of wireless capability that is crucial in developing a 
concept of operations for WSNs; it was reviewed to determine the constraints and tactics 
associated with CBRN detection. Current research in the area of WSNs is found in 
Mobile, Wireless, and Sensor Networks: Technology, Applications, and Future 
Directions (Ananda, Chan, & Ooi, 2006). This book is an excellent resource that 
represents the most thoughtful solutions to the challenges in wireless networks, including 
architecture, protocols, modeling, and analysis. The book highlights some key aspects 
central to wireless detection, such as trends and cutting-edge applications that help to 
define possible tactical elements when deploying this equipment. In the years ahead, 
wireless sensors will be employed by businesses, military, and public-service agencies to 
provide a wide array of services. This will include numerous applications that have yet to 
be implemented. The material provides a background and understanding of the practical 
approach to the many applicable possibilities establishing a foundation for developing a 
concept of operation around CBRN wireless sensor networks. Furthermore, the combined 
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literature helps to bridge the gap in understanding between the different uses of wireless 
sensor networks, taking their limitations and tactical applications into account and 
thereby establishing a solid foundation for developing a ConOps around this technology 
that is suitable for the LAFD’s HazMat program.  
Wireless technology has developed rapidly in the past decade, and new mobile 
applications are continually being proposed (Shim et al., 2007, p. 450). Within the last 10 
years, WSNs have increased their application, diversity, and value, leading to featured 
articles in trade magazines and journals that highlight this emerging technology. In 2009, 
the trade journal Sensors discussed the evolution of WSNs, pointing out that the 
information on WSNs is relatively new (Buratti et al., 2009). Although technically 
orientated, the article covered applications for environmental monitoring and discussed 
design strategies important for CBRN detection scenarios. An important element for 
WSNs is power management, which has also undergone an evolution. Power 
consumption remains one of the limitations, especially for long-term deployment. 
Academic articles discuss the most relevant issues of WSNs, from application and 
deployment to custom design possibilities. The recent advances of wireless sensor 
networks create new opportunities for innovative applications, but new technical 
challenges for constructing such applications remain (Cheour, Lahma, & Abid, 2011). 
As the field of WSNs continues to evolve, the challenge is to keep pace with the 
rapid changes, advances, and technology that continue to make sensor components more 
compact, robust, and energy efficient. Ubiquitous and embedded, often invisible and 
silent, sensing technologies will be one of the hallmarks of this century (Nagel, n.d.). 
Network designers and planners from emerging telecommunication networks face 
specific challenges in finding the best way to integrate new networks with existing 
network systems.  
Engineers are adding a new dimension to the wirelessly connected world. 
They are extending networks connecting people anywhere at any time to 
also connect anything. In other words, people are being connected to 
things, and things themselves are being interconnected. (Shim et al., 2007, 
p. 448)  
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The field of WSNs is growing rapidly. This poses additional challenges to adapt 
and produce wireless devices that are smaller, more compact, efficient, and robust. The 
literature that addresses some of those challenges is discussed in Handbook of Sensor 
Networks: Compact Wireless and Wired Sensing Systems (Ilyas & Mahgoub, 2004), a 
book that captures the current WSN climate and deals with the particular technical 
challenges associated with this technology, including elements such as software 
protocols, data processing, security, and limited power sources, which are important 
factors when configuring a wireless sensor network.  
There is not much literature that focuses on WSNs and public safety, especially in 
the area of CBRN detection. One reason for this stems from the traditional uses of WSNs, 
such as military, environmental, home, health, and commercial applications. Another 
reason centers on the unique requirements of first-responder agencies. Fire rescue is a 
special application that is different from the previous WSN-supported applications, such 
as environmental or habitat monitoring, or object tracking. Thus, there are some specific 
requirements for the design of a WSN system (Sha, Shi, & Watkins, 2006). Fire and law 
enforcement are both changing from response services to services capable of response. 
This means having the ability to anticipate problems and forecast possible solutions from 
a strategic vantage point. Fire and police agencies can improve their effectiveness by 
forecasting the operational environment, anticipating problems, identifying 
vulnerabilities, and developing plans to address those issues. Wireless technology is the 
vehicle to reaching those goals and objectives. To further illustrate this point, the 
mechanical engineering department at UC Berkeley worked on a WSN project for 
incident command interface for urban and industrial firefighting. The intent of the FIRE 
project5 is to create hardware and software tools to improve firefighting safety, 
efficiency, and effectiveness (Wilson et al., 2007).  
This stance is continuing to gain prominence within the public-safety arena; 
focusing on technology demonstrates those attributes. The necessity to enhance 
                                                 
5 Fire Information and Rescue Equipment (FIRE) is a project with the Chicago Fire Department (CFD) 
at UC Berkeley’s mechanical engineering department. The project addresses challenges by applying and 
designing new technologies such as wireless sensor networks (WSNs). 
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operational efficiency and reduce costs means taking advantage of wireless technology to 
become more capable, efficient, and cost effective. 
The majority of the research effort into wireless sensor networks have 
been on the hardware and software configurations and the modeling of the 
network performance, there has not been a great deal of work into the 
application of these sensor networks, especially when chemical sensing is 
concerned. At present, research into chemical sensors and wireless sensor 
networks are still essentially discrete fields despite the requirement in 
merging these two disciplines for applications such as environmental 
monitoring. (Hayes et al., 2008) 
The military is in the forefront regarding CBRN detection capabilities and 
innovation. Effective, timely, and accurate CBRN reconnaissance is essential to protect 
the public and the first responder. In an article on innovation technology, CBRN 
detection is gaining momentum, with the military leading the way for rapid technological 
advancements that provide near-real-time environmental monitoring. As operational 
realities shift, the development and demonstration of new defensive capabilities in the 
CBRN arena become even more urgent to ensure that the military can fight and win in 
any condition and properly prepare for the threats of tomorrow (Galarraga et al., 2009, p. 
16). This is not surprising since our military faces the CBRN threat every day. The 
existing literature on CBRN detection concerns itself with efficient and practical 
applications in hazard environments, with an emphasis on recognizing limitations, 
portability, enhanced threat detection, and urbanized terrain. The issue can be framed by 
simply trying to transition from military applications to civilian operations.  
The need for WSN in public safety has emerged as a potential tool for providing 
early detection and recognition of CBRN materials. Now sensor, environmental, and 
incident data is available to meet emergency response objectives and provide incident 
commanders and subject matter experts with the real-time data necessary for decision 
making. Wireless sensor capability is the next step toward becoming more efficient and 
providing first responders and command elements with a tool that can monitor and detect 
CBRN hazards in real-time.  
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C. DEPARTMENT HOMELAND SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY 
An important aspect in developing a concept of operations for CBRN wireless 
detection involves the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 2007, DHS published 
a report on the National Preparedness Guidelines. One of the guidelines discussed centers 
on the ability to strengthen detection, response, and decontamination capabilities to a 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive incident (USDHS, 2007a, p. 18). 
Due to the threat of such an incident, DHS has been working to deploy a nationwide 
sensor network to provide a real-time early-warning system for a plethora of chemical, 
biological, and nuclear threats across the United States (Sohraby, Minoli, & Znati, 2007, 
p. 88). These efforts underscore the need for an effective, real-time wireless sensor 
detection program to increase the probability that CBRN materials are rapidly detected, 
identified, and safely managed at critical locations and events.  
The terrorist threat has remained high and requires innovative ways to meet and 
address the challenge it presents. Overall, experts agree that in the twenty-first century 
CBRN materials may be utilized and deployed as weapons in novel ways, both in the 
military and civil domains (Frinking et al., 2009). It is the technology applied by the 
terrorist—the explosive device that destroys a target, the automatic weapon that 
intimidates, and potentially the chemical or biological weapon that inflicts mass 
casualties—that makes today’s “high impact” terrorist strikes possible and makes the 
threat of future violence credible to a mass audience (Jackson, 2001, p. 3). 
A government report, National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to 
Catastrophic Terrorism, provides a technology roadmap for federal planners to fill gaps 
in emergency responder capability against CBRN terrorism. This document lays out a 
strategy that uses technology to improve responders’ capabilities to deal with all types of 
catastrophes, whether man-made, natural, or accidental. The document’s main mission to 
develop a national technology plan, which has culminated in this report. While the report 
covers a wide range of technological issues related to terrorism prevention, chapter three 
is dedicated to detection, identification, and assessment of potential and ongoing terrorist 
attacks. This document provides a “technological roadmap” of new initiatives in an effort 
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to close the gaps in responder capabilities. However, each community relies on its own 
expertise and technical capability, which various from region to region. Thus, there has 
been little motivation or funding available to pursue integrated devices (Garwin, Pollard, 
& Tuohy, 2004). Nonetheless, the report recommends technology programs for the 
federal government with an all-hazards viewpoint. 
With the threat of a CBRN incident, there are a variety of ways that wireless 
technology can contribute to improve the detection, identification, and monitoring of 
CBRN materials. The goal is to incorporate “best practices” and to develop a 
methodology to create a universal framework with specific measures to evaluate, test, and 
monitor CBRN detection capabilities. This will help to improve the strategies for 
prevention, preparedness, and response to CBRN incidents.  
A dispassionate analysis of the still growing number of terrorist attacks 
that have occurred and are continuing to occur around the world should 
demonstrate that the United States is still not immune from many of the 
major CBRN threats now facing the nation—and may never be. For that 
reason alone, there must be not merely continued, but increased, concern 
over chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. 
(Rudner, 2010, p. 6) 
The use of WSNs is a viable resource for CBRN detection and provides public-
safety agencies with the capacity to protect and warn the public against the release of 
hazardous materials. The possible applications are discussed in many articles in the 
context of homeland security—often on the heels of an innovative technologic idea. For 
example, in 2006, a consortium of WSN experts authored a document titled, Scenario 
Definition and Initial Threat Analysis. A section of this report focused on the promising 
applications within the homeland security environment, including using wireless sensor 
networks for early CBRN detection and identification. In various scenarios, WSNs can be 
easily deployed permanently (e.g., in public places) or on demand (e.g., high-risk events) 
in a very short time, at low cost, with little or no supporting communications 
infrastructure (Casaca & Westhoff, 2006, p. 29). In these scenarios, the purpose of WSNs 
is early detection, and this can be factored into prevention and preplanning activities. 
Once those aspects are addressed, there are three operational phases: detection before, 
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during, and after a CBRN event. Before the event, CBRN detectors allow continuous 
monitoring either to prevent an incident or to facilitate early warning. During the event, 
detectors help first responders identify and isolate the precise nature and extent of the 
release. After the event, WSNs are essential in order to confirm the results of early 
identification, evidence collection, and monitoring of decontamination efforts. Timely 
detection, locating, and tracking of CBRN devices in public places are key issues in 
homeland security and require robust sensor networking (Grilo, Casaca, & Nunes, 2009, 
p. 391). 
The Science and Technology Division of DHS has identified the need to factor 
CBRN sensor capability into risk assessment and response. The literature from DHS 
outlines the need to improve and integrate technologies that will enhance our ability to 
deter, protect against, detect, mitigate, and recover from biological and chemical attacks. 
One of the stated objectives is to integrate CBRN sensor reporting capability—in 
particular, the integration of sensors into a common operating picture for easy integration 
of future detection systems (USDHS, 2009, p. 15). Wireless technology has evolved to a 
point where the LAFD can now use this know-how to establish a functional concept of 
operations for CBRN wireless sensor networks. The report identifies the need to focus on 
public-safety agencies and to take advantage of the benefits that innovative technology 
can bring. For example, the Chemical/Biological Division seeks out the science needed to 
reduce the CBRN probability and potential consequences. The division develops and 
implements early detection and warning systems for attack characterization (USDHS, 
2009, p. 4).  
Recent work on CBRN sensors addresses wireless capabilities and demonstrates 
operational effectiveness for hazard detection. Supplemental literature from DHS 
involves interoperability and communication challenges involving WSNs. For instance, a 
2008 FEMA article, NIMS Standards Case Study: Los Angeles Regional Interoperability, 
states that agencies and jurisdictions rely on disparate equipment and communications 




agencies into a combined response (USDHS, 2008). This highlights the need for 
interagency cooperation as it relates to CBRN detection capabilities and the associated 
network that brings public safety together.  
Interoperability is a factor that is addressed at all levels of government. In order to 
support the evolution of a fully integrated, modernized CBRN detection system, 
interoperability means working together, uniting resources, and exchanging data and 
information in a standardized fashion. A DHS report from 2007, titled Tactical 
Interoperability Communications Scorecards, Summary Report and Findings, indicates 
that barriers to interoperable communications are both technical and operational. 
Furthermore, the literature suggests that, in addition to addressing technology and 
disparate communications systems, achieving interoperability requires that agencies 
examine governance, procedures, training, exercises, and usage (USDHS, 2007b, p. 5). 
This reinforces the need to coordinate activities in a collaborative manner with industry 
experts and other public-safety stakeholders to ensure the viability of a CBRN wireless 
detection system.  
The literature extensively covers technological advancements with very little 
documentation on activity specific to the public-safety and response fields. Therefore, we 
must keep in mind that policies are associated with governance and tend to lag behind 
operational objectives. This is emphasized in the document Tactical Interoperability 
Communications Scorecards, Summary Report and Findings (USDHS, 2007b). The 
report addresses interoperability issues and the importance of collaboration on policies 
and strategic planning. This is further emphasized in a report published by the Joint 
Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense on the readiness of the 
CBRN network sensor: 
Currently, there are no standards for how Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) sensors communicate in terms of 
protocol or in what they communicate in terms of status (alert, alarm, 
faults, built in-test, etc.) or commands (mode, state, configuration, etc.). 
Furthermore, many of the sensors require additional intermediate 




Protocol (IP) addressable entity or to allow them to be plugged directly 
into a host platform via modern physical interfaces such as standard USB 
connections. (Godso et al., 2006, p. 25) 
Nearly all of the research on wireless sensor networks and detection deals with 
military, industrial, commercial, and environmental applications. When addressing 
emergency-response applications, the literature falls short, even though these systems can 
easily be adapted to assist the emergency-response community when facing a CBRN 
threat. Improvements in chemical detection and identification could assist the responders 
in knowing whether they are experiencing a chemical attack and what chemicals they are 
encountering (Houghton, 2004, p. 173). Such improvements would include adapting 
applications that will monitor the environment and provide an early warning when 
hazardous products are introduced.  
D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The “Concept of Operations” is a functional document that describes the goals, 
objectives, tactics, strategy, policy, procedures, and governance that is prepared in 
conjunction with the various stakeholders focusing on wireless CBRN detection and 
response. The goals and objectives for CBRN detection present challenges for the 
LAFD’s first responders and HazMat teams. Without the use of a WSN, there is a 
delayed technical response, reduced notifications, and increased time frame before 
advanced mitigation efforts can begin because real-time environmental data needs to be 
established, which takes time. Wireless technology is a recent development within the 
LAFD. The objective is to develop a predictive model and concept of operations for 
employing, monitoring, and maintaining CBRN wireless sensor capability.  
There is abundant literature regarding “Concepts of Operations” that covers a 
variety of applications, disciplines, and procedures, including the necessary components 
required to deploy the equipment. Unfortunately, there is a lack of any specific public-
safety documentation concerning the concept of operations for CBRN wireless sensor 
networks. However, the information that does exist was examined for insight regarding 
the development of a CBRN ConOps document. For example, at the national level there 
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is documentation that supports the use and implementation of new technology as an 
efficient, cost-effective, and reliable solution for detecting and responding to CBRN 
incidents. The reference documents listed below are resources that help support a 
comprehensive LAFD ConOps for CBRN wireless sensor networks document:  
• Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations, 
USAF; 
• Energy-Efficient Networking Techniques For Wireless Sensor Networks, 
U.S. Army; 
• Assessment of Chemical and Radiological Vulnerabilities, U.S. DOE; 
• Domestic Terrorists’ Intent and Capability to Use CBRN Weapons, U.S. 
Government; 
• High Priority Technology Needs, U.S. Government; 
• National Preparedness Guidelines, U.S. Government; and 
• National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, U.S. Government. 
These documents have detailed and specific information relating to the CBRN 
threat, vulnerabilities, emerging technology, and wireless capabilities. These reference 
materials also reinforce the policies and procedures related to CBRN wireless detection 
and further emphasize training and response protocols.  
The 2007 National Preparedness Guidelines report states, “It is critical that all 
levels of government coordinate the development of interagency response protocols prior 
to the deployment of detection technology” (USDHS, 2007a, p. 18). One reason for the 
lack of policy and procedural plans is that CBRN wireless networks are new, innovative, 
and not widely utilized in the public-safety sector. With regard to literature that 
establishes CBRN wireless sensor network policy, procedures, and recommended 
practices for public-safety agencies, the documentation does little more than reinforce the 
need to head in that direction.  
The review of available literature indicates there is considerable material covering 
a wide array of WSN applications. In the book titled Wireless Sensor Networks. 
Technology, Protocols, and Applications, many practical uses for WSN are discussed 
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(Sohraby, 2007). This includes coordinating with DHS to establish a nationwide sensor 
network to provide a real-time early-warning system for CBRN threats in the United 
States. A 2006 article in USA Today regarding homeland security indicated that DHS is 
focused on national security events, including athletic venues and arenas, which are 
considered viable targets in the planning scenarios (Andy, 2006). Wireless sensor 
applications and detection platforms are a practical tool within the homeland security 
architecture. Due to the relatively new expansion into the first-responder community, 
gaps exist in understanding, deployment, components, and design, leaving opportunity to 
increase the knowledge base within the public-safety domain. The literature elucidates 
the use of technology and reveals the ability to enhance homeland security and strengthen 
CBRN detection and response capabilities. Furthermore, policy and procedures need to 
be developed and introduced as part of an overall ConOps document as this technology 
moves forward and becomes part of the CBRN prevention and detection environment.  
The literature addresses the challenges and advancements in the rapidly changing 
technological environment of WSNs. This thesis forms the basis for policy 
recommendations involving wireless CBRN sensor deployment with an emphasis on 
standardized procedures. The literature helps to define the conceptual landscape for 
practical applications in public safety, CBRN threat potential, and the operational 
environment. The objective is to develop a ConOps for the LAFD regarding CBRN 
wireless detection to enable the ability to optimally deploy assets to deter, detect, prevent, 
and respond to hazardous-materials threats. The goal is to determine the best way to 
utilize CBRN wireless sensors to maximize resources, provide early detection and 
notification, and ensure that public safety remains a top priority. WSNs provide a viable 
option towards that important endeavor. When complete, the LAFD ConOps for CBRN 
wireless sensors networks will outline an operation for future and existing systems, 
procedures, training, and maintenance that includes interagency roles and responsibilities.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The concept of operations for CBRN wireless sensor networks within the LAFD 
supports current hazardous-materials operations. This analysis provides needed data and 
guidance for developing operational doctrine for LAFD HazMat teams to effectively 
manage deployment, information acquisition and distribution, and response. By focusing 
on what has been done in terms of developing a ConOps for CBRN wireless sensor 
networks, the LAFD’s HazMat operations are able to determine the correct trajectory for 
implementing this technology. This requires examining various academic, professional, 
and government documents that discuss this emerging technology. In addition, LAFD 
operational manuals were evaluated to properly frame a ConOps for CBRN wireless 
detection and to determine goals and objectives. Technical reports and academic 
publications provided information on the challenges associated with this wireless 
detection and the proper tactics to ensure optimum performance. Standards are being 
applied to wireless sensor networks, and by working with the federal government, the 
LAFD can establish policies and govern these systems accordingly. This is a critical 
element due to the multidisciplinary, multijurisdictional nature of incidents involving 
CBRN materials or devices. This forms the basis for interaction among participants and 
stakeholders and is vital to the development of a concept of operations for CBRN 
wireless sensor networks.  
The development of a concept of operations for CBRN wireless sensor networks 
includes examining the vulnerabilities and potential threats associated with the 
consequences of CBRN attacks on public facilities and critical locations. The potential 
threat requires the development of defensive strategies aimed at recognizing, detecting, 
and responding to CBRN threat and attacks. The implementation of specific 
countermeasures designed to provide early warning and identification of an attack in real-
time is critical to reducing adverse health effects and limiting property damage. The 
goals, objectives, challenges, tactics, strategy, policies, governance, support agencies, and 
components are all central to implementing a CBRN wireless sensor network. 
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Wireless technology has developed rapidly in the past decade, and new 
applications are continually being introduced and implemented. The analysis involves 
highlighting the equipment required and capturing data along with the issues encountered 
to gain a better understanding of how wireless CBRN detection will enhance operational 
efficiency and increase safety. Through the analysis process, a formal concept for 
operational readiness took shape, identifying this technology as a viable early-warning 
and recognition tool vital for hazardous-materials prevention and response. 
The analysis identified the need for command and control elements to have direct 
access to sensor data, response teams, and subject matter experts. Operational review and 
analysis of sensor displays and data collected during the actual deployments provide a 
baseline for future tactical operations, adaptation, and lessons learned. The wireless 
sensor framework is a mixed-initiative environment that supports HazMat activities with 
a multiagency, multidisciplinary approach to hazardous-materials response. This includes 
support for joint operations and command staff from different agencies, all working 
together in an effort to provide and maintain a safe environment based on threat 
information, trends, and capabilities. In the context of this work, operational elements 
include a wide variety of possible interactions among the various stakeholders, agencies, 
and response personnel. This includes real-time data acquisition and visualization of 
deployed sensors. Postdeployment review is a side benefit that allows a thorough critique 
of the operation, the hazards presented, and possible response options, based on 
environmental information collected.  
A. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES  
The goal of a CBRN wireless sensor network is to detect, collect, synthesize, 
distribute, and monitor the environment for hazards in real time. The objective is to 
assess that information, take appropriate action as early as possible, and make key 
notification to personnel. A WSN can accomplish these objectives in real time while 
providing first responders and subject matter experts a safe working environment. The 
ConOps document can serve as a reference for designing, deploying, and implementing a 
CBRN wireless sensor network in the public arena, where the threat potential is great.  
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No longer could firefighters, police officers, emergency medical 
technicians and other emergency responders restrict their disaster planning 
and preparation to resolving the results of hurricanes, earthquakes, fires 
and the like. They could not be content knowing what to do in the event of 
a terrorist or criminal act involving guns, bullets and bombs. Now there 
was a new threat, that of a terrorist [with] a weapon containing toxic 
chemicals, biological pathogens or radioactive material. (Eifried, 2004) 
Policies are necessary to govern the application of CBRN wireless sensor 
networks. The analysis from events, exercises, and deployments helps frame what is 
needed, the trajectory the technology should follow, and rapidity with which the change 
should occur. Due to the emergent nature and rapid growth of WSNs, many LAFD 
members have opinions, positions, and demands related to WSN capability. 
The likelihood of ongoing technological change within the LAFD points to the 
value of establishing an adaptive learning system associated with new policies involving 
new equipment. This should include the ability to track and anticipate advances in CBRN 
wireless technology along with ways of implementing and using emerging wireless 
CBRN detection sensors. The development of a ConOps for CBRN wireless sensor 
networks must take these aspects into consideration. In addition, training and exercises 
can be augmented to include wireless sensor networks to help prepare personnel and to 
inform assisting agencies about this technology. The purpose of this analysis is to provide 
LAFD command structure and key agencies with reference material when it becomes 
necessary for strategic planning, team configuration, equipment acquisition, maintenance, 
training, and costs. 
B. CONSTRAINTS AND TACTICS  
The constraints and tactics associated with CBRN wireless sensor networks deal 
with the challenges and limitations associated with this technology. This requires the 
development of a standardized deployment model, security, notification protocols, 
information sharing, and training requirements. The environmental sensor application has 
special characteristics, such as high mobility, real-time monitoring, and maintenance 
requirements. This requires a set of protocols that takes into consideration the challenges 
of communication and interoperability and the manner in which those factors are 
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integrated and assessed for wireless sensor network applications. The tactical constraints 
associated with CBRN wireless sensor detection highlight the need for interoperability 
functionality. Wireless interoperability is important because it dramatically improves 
operational effectiveness and personnel safety. In order to take advantage of broadband 
applications and achieve interoperability, public safety systems must migrate to shared 
Internet protocol-based next-generation networks that are part of an “ecosystem” with 
commercial providers (Report Recommends Actions, 2007). This is especially true when 
performing in conjunction with allied fire and police agencies, regional resources, and 
specialized units to establish a common operating picture. What this means is that new 
protocols and support for both the hardware and software are needed to build a robust 
wireless sensor system. There is clearly a void in this area, largely due to the fact that 
there is no formal guidance structure that illustrates the correct sequence of equipment, 
personnel, training, or technology that should be acquired. The problem arises from 
multiple agents, confusing information, conflicting values, and competing interests.  
Empirical analysis of ongoing CBRN wireless sensor network efforts is largely 
absent, and no independent comprehensive study of WSNs has been conducted for this 
purpose. This is not to say that these systems are not being explored, designed, and 
deployed in other areas. However, there is limited knowledge about setting up such 
systems, where or why they are forming, and the benefits realized. Based on data from 
private sector applications, some specific challenges related to wireless sensor networks 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
• Limited functional capabilities, including problems of size; 
• Power factors; 
• Node costs; 
• Environmental factors; 
• Transmission channel factors; 
• Topology management complexity and node distribution; 
• Standards versus proprietary solutions; and 
• Scalability concerns. (Sohraby, Minoli, & Znati, 2007, p. 29) 
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WSNs have evolved from hard-wired systems into an ad hoc wireless network 
that shares many commonalities with those previous systems and yet has some unique 
characteristics. Due to these circumstances, WSNs that focus on CBRN detection have 
specific design and implementation requirements. In order to meet operational needs, 
these requirements can present certain challenges such as power requirements, 
communications, interoperability, and weather limitations. By understanding the 
limitations experienced in similar applications and by incorporating alternatives into our 
operational plans, these challenges can be managed accordingly.  
Although there is an overall objective when deploying wireless sensor equipment, 
the focus is on the tactical and strategic elements in support of command staff and 
operational personnel. Planning and preparation for large public-gathering and high-
profile events involve a combination of resources and equipment. Two modalities for 
deploying wireless sensor equipment are both tactical and strategic in nature.  
Tactical Considerations: 
• Specific site information; 
• Controlled access to available sensor data; 
• Detailed real-time sensor and environmental information; 
• Data collection and analysis; and 
• Instant situational awareness. 
Strategic Considerations: 
• Multidisciplinary, multiagency buy-in; 
• Developed response. mitigation, and recovery data; 
• Notifications (email, phone, SMS, etc.);  
• Scenario-based planning; and 
• Lessons learned and best practices. 
A CBRN wireless sensor network can provide needed situational awareness for 
key locations, taking a preventive stance that incorporates environmental monitoring with 
technically trained emergency-response personnel. The application and deployment 
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potential for wireless sensor networks are limitless, and their use depends on the specific 
need, location, objective, sensor configuration, and system infrastructure requirements. 
The primary application for a CBRN wireless sensor network within the LAFD focuses 
on maintaining situational awareness, monitoring the atmosphere for contaminates, 
making notifications, connecting subject matter experts, and providing first responders 
and command personnel with real-time data on environmental conditions. Actual 
deployment and operational functions help define ease-of-use parameters.  
In literally hundreds of discussions with emergency responders during 
training sessions and other venues, some commonly desired characteristics 
of field detectors were frequently stated. Equipment needs to be user 
friendly, easy to train on and easy to use when the responder is in full 
protective gear. Because detectors of chemical and biological toxic 
material are not going to be used on a daily basis, the skills required to use 
them will be fragile, so the simpler the better. (Eifried, 2004, p. 16) 
Terrorists have declared their intention to acquire and use weapons of mass 
destruction to inflict catastrophic attacks against the United States and its allies, partners, 
and other interests (Homeland Security Council, 2007). This type of threat poses a 
significant risk to the U.S. homeland and demands innovative ways to reduce our 
vulnerability in this area. The potential that chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
materials will be used inappropriately or by terrorists requires a unified national response. 
This is especially true if CBRN devices are employed in crowded places, enclosed 
buildings, stadiums, subways, shopping malls, and other high-occupancy locations. To 
adequately address this threat requires taking advantage of available technology and 
incorporating faster and more reliable methods to detect, identify, and assess potential 
hazards. The objective is to utilize innovative solutions to connect hazardous detection 
equipment to a wireless system, creating a network of sensors accessible by an Internet 
connection.  
There are numerous commercial and public-safety applications covering a wide 
spectrum of uses for WSNs. A sensor network is an infrastructure made up of sensing 
(measuring), computing, and communication elements that gives an administrator the 
ability to instrument, observe, and react to events and phenomena in a specified 
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environment (Sohraby, Minoli, & Znati, 2007, p.1). These can include agriculture, road 
service, traffic, military, border patrol, maintenance, and building automation. The focus 
is on using WSNs for CBRNE detection within the homeland security environment, 
paying particular attention to mass-gathering special events and critical public locations.  
An important aspect of homeland security at the local level addresses securing 
public areas, buildings, and mass-gathering locations from terrorist attacks, as 
emphasized in the 2007 National Preparedness Guidelines. An effective, real-time 
wireless sensor detection program will increase the probability that CBRN materials are 
rapidly detected, identified, and safely managed at critical locations and events. The 
integration of WSNs into the LAFD HazMat operations is a viable solution and provides 
response personnel with the right technology to protect the public against intentional 
hazardous materials releases. Within the homeland security environment, CBRN 
detection and identification is a promising WSN application, easily deployable, in a very 
short time. The proper use and implementation of a WSN reduces response and 
mitigation costs because of the early warning and product identification features. This is 
an efficient, cost effective, and reliable solution for detecting and responding to CBRN 
incidents. Rapid identification—a qualitative and quantitative determination of the 
unknown agent—is necessary for the selection of adequate protective measures 
(protective masks and clothing, as well as medical treatment), the mapping of the 
contamination area, and the identification of decontamination procedures 
(Vijayaraghavan, Ganesan, & Raza, 2010).  
C. POLICIES AND GOVERNANCE 
The policies and governance required by the National Preparedness Guidelines 
helps to establish the need to standardize detection methods and formalize wireless sensor 
applications. The necessary policies and governance begin with the premise that 
continual effort must be made to improve efficacy in the area of CBRN detection. This 
new technology requires guidelines and universally accepted applications.  
This source is meant to inform and educate national security professionals on joint 
and integrated operations, security policy, strategy, guidance, and training to meet 
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tomorrow’s challenges. Rapid technological change in the CBRN detection arena 
combined with improved communications and reduced costs has significant 
opportunities. Against this background, policies need to be established, and governing 
bodies must recognize that traditional HazMat operations need to be upgraded with more 
appropriate instruments. Of particular concern are the labor-intense, time-consuming 
models used to detect and assess CBRN hazards. Indeed, with fire departments relying 
increasingly on commercial, off-the-shelf sensor equipment, developing guidelines for 
this technology is economically justified. Although the technology has moved forward, 
the documentation specific to the public-safety arena has not kept pace. Policies 
associated with governance are needed.  
Planning and procedures include the necessary functions that foster authority, 
operating guidelines, communications, and emergency actions. The equipment and 
personnel must meet established principles for operating wireless sensor detection 
apparatus. The LAFD hazardous-materials personnel must have a developed CBRN 
wireless sensor network plan. The ConOps lays down a set of principles that address the 
desired goals and objectives set within a policy that governs the stakeholders working on 
CBRN detection. The literature helps to define the practical applications associated with 
this technology and helps to maintain standards applied to wireless sensor networks. This 
includes providing a safe and healthy workplace for all responders. 
D. ENABLING INFRASTRUCTURE 
1. Remote SME Collaboration 
One of the benefits of using Wireless Sensor Networks is the ability to bring 
together different subject matter experts from fire, law, and health personnel, all capable 
of monitoring the sensor data from a remote and safe location. WSNs allow multiple 
SMEs to detect, identify, measure, locate, and track CBRN products as they enter or are 
released within an environment.. The sensor information can be made immediately 
available to any supporting agency, providing real-time situational awareness on 
environmental conditions. The ability to maintain situational awareness and make real-
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time decisions relies on the ability to have accurate and timely information. The 
deployment of a WSN provides allied agencies with the information necessary to deploy 
or redirect their assets as conditions warrant. Response times are reduced because any 
activation or trigger immediately notifies all stakeholders with site-specific data, 
facilitating a more thorough assessment of the conditions and resources that might be 
needed. Information exchange, coordination among the participating entities, allocation 
of available resources, and decision making are byproducts of a WSN ConOps document.  
This dynamic is emphasized by the formation of joint hazard assessment teams 
(JHATs). One of the steps taken toward addressing the threat of terrorism involving 
CBRN materials was the formation of a JHAT in Los Angeles. This process involved the 
assembly of technical experts from different agencies, such as fire, police, health, FBI, 
and military. The JHAT performs as a single entity with joint operational capability 
irrespective of agency affiliation. In the event of a real threat, the JHAT team provides 
immediate on-scene technical assessment capability that can be deployed rapidly, has 
already been integrated into the command structure, and has established liaisons with 
special operations teams assigned to support the event (Hawley, Noll, & Hildebrand, 
2009, p. 3).  
A JHAT is a multidisciplinary, multijurisdictional team working in concert and 
capable of providing the incident command team with the best intelligence and 
specialized skills as a unified team. This provides the incident commander and supporting 
agencies with a force capable of providing the best possible options for incident 
resolution. The combination of resources provides all the stakeholders with the critical 
data and threat information to more effectively manage the incident. The team performs 
as a single entity with joint operational capability. Specific duties include the ability to 
provide: 
• Credible assessment of the threat and the strategic impact of the event; 
• WMD and CBRNE tactical information; 
• Technical data on the type of hazard or agent present; 
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• Recommended size of the perimeter, exclusion zones, and evacuation 
distances; 
• Options for mitigation (HazMat), render safe procedures (bomb squad), 
and the control of active shooter(s) (SWAT); 
• Patient viability, decontamination, and rescue potential; 
• Personal protection equipment (PPE) selection; and 
• Specialized resource needs and location. 
In Los Angeles, a networked approach such as the JHAT, combined with wireless 
sensor equipment, Internet conductivity, and subject matter experts, means public safety 
interests are addressed using available technology directed toward achieving a common 
objective. Typically, only command post personnel would have access to incident data; 
however, by utilizing technology and working jointly with supporting agencies, 
information can be shared and accessed by all stakeholders. 
2. Flexible System Configuration 
The deployment of WSNs is a vital instrument that can be used for fixed facilities 
and mobile units and on an ad hoc basis for special events. Early detection, mapping, and 
monitoring hazardous products in public places are key homeland security priorities. The 
ability to deploy these systems quickly, at relatively low cost, provides early detection for 
first responders. Taking advantage of this technology improves environmental coverage 
and detection capabilities at predefined and designated locations. The net effect of this 
arrangement is reduced false alarms and quicker response. This equates to better decision 
making and more efficient use of limited resources. Evolving requirements for new 
WSNs include, among others:  
• The ability to respond to new toxic chemicals, explosives, and biological 
agents; 
• Enhanced sensitivity, selectivity, speed, robustness, and fewer false 
alarms;  and 
• The ability to function, perhaps autonomously, in unusual, extreme, and 
complex environments (Sohraby, Minoli, & Znati, 2007, p. 87). 
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Advancements in wireless technology and sensor equipment allow public-safety 
agencies the ability to predeploy a WSN, in an ad hoc fashion, if necessary, and in a 
highly dynamic environment. The mobility and transportability allows this technology to 
be applied anytime and anywhere there is a CBRN threat to a specific location or venue. 
The ability to ensure public safety at large-scale, high-profile, mass-gathering 
events such as the Grammy Awards, Golden Globe Awards, Emmy Awards, Academy 
Awards, Rose Bowl, NBA Finals, and other special events presents challenges to 
response personnel. As a result, federal and local agencies are now working together for 
high-profile events like the Emmys and Oscars in a way they never had before because 
the world changed on September 11, 2001 (Wang, 2002). Security, emergency response, 
evacuation, and event planning have been forever changed when dealing with large 
groups of people gathered in one location. The Department of Homeland Security has 
established a priority classification for national security–special events of this nature. 
This includes athletic events and arenas, which were identified as viable marks in a 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) planning scenario (Andy, 2006). DHS is 
coordinating an effort for the end-of-decade deployment of a nationwide sensor network 
to provide a real-time early-warning system for a plethora of chemical, biological, and 
nuclear threats across the United States (Sohraby, Minoli, & Znati, 2007, p. 88). These 
plans include developing capabilities for mass transit and other public gathering locations 
to deal with CBRN threats targeted at airports, subways, and buildings. 
It is unfortunate, but a fact of modern life includes the existence of terrorist 
groups and individuals. Mass-gathering locations provide an opportunity to make a 
statement by setting off a device or by releasing a hazardous substance. Key historical 
dates and events, large public gatherings, and locations or meetings with political, social, 
or ethnic agendas are only a few of the targets likely to provide terrorists with a means to 
present their message (United States Army, 2000). 
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3. Open Architecture and Components 
The WSN architecture incorporates technology, wireless components, and 
existing sensor equipment to provide environmental and threat monitoring of specific 
locations. There are four basic components in a sensor network:  
1. An assembly of distributed or localized sensors; 
2. An interconnecting network (usually, but not always, wireless-based); 
3. A central point of information clustering; and  
4. A set of computing resources at the central point (or beyond) to handle 
data correlation, event trending, status querying, and data mining. 
(Sohraby, Minoli, & Znati, 2007, p. 1). 
The equipment and technology is configured, so that it can be portable and 
adaptable to meet building and environmental parameters. This is accomplished by 
deploying different sensing equipment in key positions within target buildings, special 
events, and transportation areas. The technical competency is enhanced by involving the 
different public-safety disciplines. This allows for a more thorough assessment of the 
vulnerabilities and potential threats associated with each location. From a situational 
awareness perspective, the goal is to produce a virtual environment by strategically 
placing sensor, GSP, video, and weather monitoring equipment at designated locations 
where large groups of people will gather.  
In order to achieve the intended functionality, several components and their 
characteristics must be identified and taken into consideration. WSNs are a combination 
of sensors, communication elements, software, hardware, and personnel to monitor, 
interpret, analyze, and respond to the data. The system components include: 
• Sensors (CBRNE, temperature, humidity, wind, GPS, video); 
• Connection (Ethernet, IrDA, analog, TTL, RS232); 
• Communications (network, gateway, router, Internet, WiFi, cellular, 
satellite); 
• Software (GIS, Plume, Live Sensor, video, Hazard Guidance, reference); 
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• Destination (command post, subject matter experts); 
• Notifications (web service, email, TCP/IP, phone, radio); 
• Information Sharing (NIEM, EDX/CAP, XML); and 
• Alerts (text to voice, SMS, email, pager, radio). 
The individual components all function together, establishing a network that can 
detect, measure, locate, track, and report on a hazardous substance release, fire, oxygen 
level, flammable environment, and the presence of radioactive particles. This framework 
has the capability to maintain historical data in order to replicate events and detection 
alarms for future evaluation and analyses. There are two sensor deployment 
configurations that can provide environmental coverage. Sensors and monitors can be 
stationary, positioned in a fixed, clandestine position, and deployed prior to an event. 
This allows for testing and dry runs to be conducted, which helps to establish a baseline 
for environmental conditions. Another deployment model uses mobile sensors attached to 
personnel and vehicles. The mobile configuration provides detection coverage over a 
wider area and allows for manual adjustments due to changes in conditions. A potential 
drawback of mobile configurations deals with the potential to lose connectivity to 
network infrastructure. This can occur for a number of reasons, such as the distance, 
range, signal strength, obstructions, and power supply. The ideal scenario incorporates 
both fixed and stationary sensors coupled with mobile sensors to provide the best 
detection capability. 
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V. FINDINGS 
Employing a wireless CBRN detection network will support the LAFD’s 
hazardous materials response, enabling better coordination and communication among 
the various stakeholders. At the present time not much has been done within the context 
of establishing protocols for wireless sensor networks within the public-safety domain. 
The nation is at a critical juncture regarding the future of emergency communications 
(House Homeland Security Subcommittee, 2010). DHS and other government agencies 
have recognized the need to enhance communications systems at the local, state, and 
federal levels across all disciplines. We have an opportunity to change the trajectory of 
United States response to emergency events (House Homeland Security Subcommittee, 
2010). The inclusion of this technology at the local level is a step towards enhancing 
communications, detecting hazardous materials early, and sharing vital information 
among the various constituents associated with terrorism and homeland security. 
The material examined helped to outline the goals and objectives, enabling the 
formation of a concept of operations for CBRN detection utilizing a wireless sensor 
network within the LAFD. The research determined that the implementation of a wireless 
sensor network fell in line with DHS recommendations to strengthen the ability to detect, 
distribute, and share homeland security incident information across agencies. The 
literature reinforced the need to develop and implement a system that could help identify 
CBRN hazards early and provide a mechanism to make that information available to all 
stakeholders. The action taken in the greater Los Angeles area includes using wireless 
sensor technology to increase the identification and response time in the event that CBRN 
material is released into the atmosphere. This technology is available and being explored 
in different capacities, emphasizing the need for wireless sensor network protocols. 
Currently, immediate action by first responders is required to help victims severely 
impacted by a fast-acting hazardous agent. To increase the lead time, it is important that 
wireless sensor monitoring equipment be deployed and activated to provide as much 
early warning as possible in order to increase survivability and facilitate evacuation.  
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The research identified possible constraints with wireless sensor networks, 
including limitations on tactical deployments. There was considerable information that 
represented the best solutions to the various applications to increase effectiveness. An 
important finding included some challenges associated with wireless networks that 
focused on architecture, protocols, modeling, and analysis. Some key aspects were 
brought to light, such as trends in other settings and cutting-edge applications that could 
be tailored to work with the public-safety, emergency-response framework. This helped 
identify tactical elements and considerations necessary when deploying this equipment. 
The material researched provided the background and understanding for developing a 
concept of operation around CBRN wireless sensor networks suitable for the fire service. 
Furthermore, review of the literature helped to establish limitations, such as power supply 
and Internet reliability, which could interfere with deploying wireless equipment in 
certain locations.  
There is a need to establish policies to govern the application of an LAFD concept 
of operations regarding wireless sensor detection. The material examined highlighted the 
benefits, architecture, resources, and alternatives for such a system. The policy must 
reflect changes and desired outcomes as the system continues to take shape. Policies will 
help to establish procedures that guide how decisions are made and how the tasks are 
performed when utilizing WSNs. A ConOps for CBRN wireless sensor networks will be 
a foundation document. Well-written policies and procedures will increase 
accountability; they are fundamental to quality assurance and improvements. This 
includes determining how supporting agencies should interact. In the absence of a written 
ConOps, unacceptable different approaches will make the LAFD inconsistent and 
ineffective during these operations.  
The research process helped to define the enabling infrastructure that supports a 
concept of operations for the LAFD’s wireless sensor detection plan. The framework for 
a WSN program is based on the technology currently being used in other areas, such as 
the military and within the private sector. The LAFD takes a holistic view of the 
technology helping to outline a practical method to wirelessly detect hazardous releases, 
predict product dispersion patterns, determine exposure levels, and integrate live video 
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feeds. The ground work previously completed allows a more precise understanding of the 
environment, the equipment, and the personnel required to ensure an effective wireless 
detection system. WSNs provide and maintain situational awareness with respect to 
location, anticipated threats, product identification, and weather and climate conditions. 
Interoperable sensor technology opens a path to fully exercise the risk assessment phase 
demonstrated in actual conditions. The quantitative summary of the benefits include the 
capabilities, enhancement to current CBRN operations, deleted tasks, and improved 
efficiency. With this in mind, “chemical detection in the civil market is fairly 
straightforward” (Winfield, 2004, p. 61). However, simply detecting CBRN materials is 
not enough for fire and police agencies. When such materials are released, they must 
respond, evacuate, treat, and take action to mitigate the effects of any release. The sort of 
scenario in which a civilian force will find itself, where an explosion has already taken 
place in an area of high population density (Winfield, 2004, p. 61) requires chemical and 
radiation detection systems, GIS, and weather information. 
Thus, a basic chemical agent monitor that can confirm what their eyes are 
seeing (people in obvious pain) is adequate for most forces. There is some 
interest in capital cities, City of London for example, in having a 
GID24/76 type system that can be placed on buildings and networked to 
provide both a situational awareness picture and a warning of chemical 
attack. This has already been done for large events, such as the 
Commonwealth Games in the UK and is likely to be chosen for the 
Olympics. (Winfield, 2004, p. 62) 
This is a low-probability–high-consequence event that maximizes resources trying 
to address the CBRN threat. Based on case studies and the analysis of specific 
requirements for CBRN detection, wireless sensor networks offer a practical solution. 
There are some disadvantages and limitations associated with this technology. 
The initial drawback will be the startup cost for the new equipment. Although some 
WSNs can be designed to utilize existing sensor equipment, there is still a need to acquire 
supporting hardware and software. The costs associated with establishing a WSN include 
                                                 
6 The GID (24/7) is a continuously operating low “through life” cost networked fixed point CW Agent 
Detector System suitable for military and commercial applications inside critical facilities, buildings, and 
transportation systems. See www.smithsdetection.com. 
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the cost to train and familiarize personnel with the new equipment. This will include 
providing a brief understanding of the practical applications and tactics required to ensure 
optimum performance. Furthermore, since this is considered a specialized operation, 
access will need to be limited to a select group of highly trained personnel. 
Another limitation will arise in having personnel take on new responsibilities, 
including allied agencies requiring a need to define their roles. The initial phase of 
implementation may bring about some anxiety, as is frequently associated with 
introducing new technology. User misunderstanding may also present problems because 
the equipment has not been exposed to all stakeholders, both internal and external, 
requiring close coordination with allied agencies. When looking for available equipment, 
interoperability, and compatibility, it will require research to identify a vendor with 
credibility. In addition, developing a working relationship with the vendor is essential for 
understanding the agency’s needs and long-term requirements. This will include ensuring 
that service and maintenance concerns are addressed for equipment and software 
upgrades.  
Despite the challenges, sensible wireless applications are being incorporated into 
the LAFD planning and operation phases. This includes utilizing the technology for 
mass-gathering and large, high-profile events that would results in a high casualty count 
if a CBRN device were deployed. 
A. THE LAFD CONOPS FRAMEWORK 
The process needed for a successful ConOps requires a comprehensive evaluation 
of elements that enables all stakeholders, both strategic and tactical, to understand the 
capabilities, benefits, and intent of a CBRN wireless sensor network. The key aspects 
should include the following: 
1. The purpose and overview of a CBRN wireless sensor network; 
2. When the CBRN wireless sensor network should be deployed; 
3. All the necessary equipment, software, and components that allow a 
wireless sensor network to function; 
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4. The setup requirements, maintenance, and environment for operational 
efficiency; 
5. The personnel and training needed to install, maintain, monitor, analyze, 
and respond to alarms and activations; 
6. The interoperability features and characteristics that allow the ability to 
interface with other systems; 
7. The system or operation that the CBRN wireless sensor network is 
intended to enhance; and 
8. How to properly integrate a CBRN wireless sensor network into current 
hazardous materials operational plans. 
The ConOps framework needs to address the following issues: 
(1) Scope: This section should provide an overview of the system, current 
situation, background, objectives, application, and effectiveness. 
(a) Vision 
(b) Justification for change 
(c) Outline of the document contents, reference documentation 
(d) Purpose and need for implementing a CBRN wireless sensor 
network 
(e) Benefits and intended consequences 
(f) Limitations and challenges 
(2) Reference and Case Studies: 
(a) Academic and operational background 
(b) Case studies from exercises and deployments 
(c) Mission requirements and operational needs 
(d) Policy and protocols 
(3) Operational Roles and Responsibilities: 
(a) Hazardous-materials teams  
(b) Deployment considerations 
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(c) Operational procedures 
(d) Response considerations 
(e) Notification protocols 
(f) Allied agency involvement and responsibility 
(4) Component Overview: 
(a) Major system components and interconnections 
(b) Functionality and capabilities 
(c) Interfaces and external systems requirements 
(d) Interoperability and relationship to other systems 
(e) Maintenance 
(f) Performance characteristics 
(g) Portability, reusability, survivability 
(5) Policy and Protocols: 









The ConOps should include the necessary information to reflect the LAFD’s 
vision as it pertains to integrating wireless sensor technology into hazardous-materials 
operations. The ConOps should include expectations of the benefits that the system will 
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provide. This will require leadership to ensure that all stakeholders have a voice in 
defining the prospects for deployment, time, costs, and expertise needed for 
implementation. This involves technical research in order to conceptualize the system 
requirements and the subsystems that will make wireless sensor networks viable.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The LAFD’s “Concepts of Operations for CBRN Wireless Sensor Networks” is 
an internal effort within the hazardous-materials section to assure that the proper 
application and capability exists for essential detection functions across a wide range of 
threats involving CBRN materials. There is a desire to develop and implement WSNs 
into LAFD operational plans, especially to detect CBRN threats early and in real time. 
Policy recommendations should include interoperability concerns such as governance, 
standard operating procedures, technology, training, and usage (USDHS, 2007b, p. 3). In 
the context of public safety, a ConOps document requires a holistic approach, 
incorporating national recommendations, and taking into account communication 
standards and available wireless technology. 
The ConOps should involve mission-essential functions, including plans and 
capabilities in both emergency and nonemergency roles. This will entail delegating 
authority and combining subject matter experts from allied agencies to ensure that 
knowledgeable personnel are involved in the development process. Key elements should 
include equipment, tracking, monitoring, identified facilities or locations, resources, 
response capability, alarm thresholds, and notification protocols. This will establish a 
foundation for response with adequate resources necessary for the performance of 
hazardous-materials operations involving CBRN wireless sensor detection. The ConOps 
document supports the LAFD’s level of readiness and capability to respond, detect 
hazards, make notifications, and coordinate resources with and without advanced 
warning. 
Guidance and leadership should take a “best practice” stance to ensure that a solid 
research and business foundation is developed to make decisions that are financially 
sound and provide value to the LAFD and the public. This requires creating budgets and 
schedules, strategic planning and goal setting, project coordination, cost-benefit analysis, 
and return of investment comparisons. In today’s economy these measures are becoming 
a fundamental element within the hazardous-materials operational process. All levels of 
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command within the LAFD hazardous-materials section should plan, budget, and execute 
their ability to support wireless sensor network operations.  
It should be understood that implementing a WSN is a multidisciplinary operation 
requiring unified coordination among agencies. The supporting organizations and 
interactions among participants and stakeholders will improve the LAFD’s CBRN 
detection operations by identifying essential functions within each agency to assure the 
coordination of operations, align deployment and response, and facilitate tactics and 
strategy. This includes providing a wireless sensor network understanding for command 
elements within each organization. The effort should focus on the available support 
within the various government authorities that have response and legal responsibilities to 
prevent, protect, respond, and mitigate CBRN threats. 
The ConOps should determine the associated risk based on threat information, 
including past attack scenarios. This understanding is necessary to determine the trends 
and potentials, capabilities, locations of targets, vulnerabilities, and capability of 
resources, both internal and external. This may involve situations that require preplanning 
facilities, assessing public venues, and reconnaissance of surrounding infrastructure 
before deploying wireless sensor equipment. Response elements must understand the 
environment, determine the potential hazards, and alert other critical personnel. The 
LAFD hazardous-materials wireless sensor detection program should be designed to 
enhance mission effectiveness by incorporating a teamwork philosophy to apply the 
appropriate capabilities in concert with allied agencies to provide early detection, rapid 
response, identification of hazards, and control against the recognized risks. 
The basis for this approach sets the stage for meeting stated goals and objectives 
for WSN within the LAFD’s hazardous-materials program. This approach will shift the 
focus from a “risk aversion” to “risk management” perspective by providing access to 
subject matter experts across the spectrum of emergency response. A careful balance in 
the mitigation of a CBRN risk can be accomplished through effective integration of other 
critical networks, including the Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles County 
Health, the Los Angeles Sheriff Department, the Los Angeles County Fire Department, 
and fusion center resources. This process should evaluate the criticality of the hazardous-
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materials mission and determine the degree of CBRN exposure and the severity of risk to 
the responders, the public, the environment, and the facility. If a CBRN sensor reaches 
established preset thresholds, LAFD hazardous-materials personnel should focus risk 






• Evacuation; and 
• Mitigation. 
These activities should focus on the ability of responding agencies to: 
• Reduce the vulnerability; 
• Reduce the risk; and 
• Reduce the exposure. 
The ConOps provides an opportunity to evaluate the wireless CBRN detection 
and response models while determining the risk of each capability and establishing 
mitigation priorities. Consideration should be given to identifying the capabilities and 
controls necessary to ensure mission continuation throughout the detection and response 
process. This will include checking for overlap and providing redundant capabilities to 
ensure:  
• Creation of dual-use equipment based on mission priorities; 
• Secure portals for routine and emergency information dissemination; 
• Mission capability through enhanced communication networks; 
• Security classification and need-to-know aspects when determining 
operational plans; and 
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• Fiscal accountability. 
Inherent in this responsibility is the need to formulate guidance for the LAFD’s 
hazardous-materials program. This should include the development of viable, executable 
wireless detection plans that take into account interagency coordination as appropriate 
and that oversee and assess the status of CBRN wireless sensor detection readiness. The 
key elements necessary to maintain continuity of operations and enhance decision 
making are the command and control aspects that can be achieved through organization 
of appropriate subject matter experts in the areas of communications, computers, 
intelligence, and hazardous materials. 
It is important to incorporate and institutionalize CBRN wireless sensor network 
concepts into relevant LAFD doctrine, policies, strategies, programs, budgets, training, 
exercises, and evaluation methods. This will require a comprehensive and effective 
hazardous-material program that is adequately planned, designed, programmed, and 
budgeted to ensure the CBRN hazardous-material continuity that is essential for 
providing uninterrupted operation, irrespective of personnel changes, promotions, or 
retirements. 
Command-level officers need to incorporate administrative requirements into the 
ConOps that support the planning and execution of budgets including equipment, 
maintenance schedules, service costs, and replacement costs, as required. These include 
assets and resources to develop, maintain, and operate facilities, communication, and 
transportation equipment. In addition, command personnel need to consider the 
development of plans that will validate and update operational needs based on mission 
requirements and new available technology.  
Another key element is an outline of the decision process for determining 
appropriate actions in implementing operational plans and procedures, with or without 
warning, during duty and nonduty hours, that provides for alert and notification of 
response elements to include SMEs, outside agencies, and command-staff personnel. In 
the planning phase, consideration should be given to addressing the “stand-down” and 
“notification” aspects so that operations can transition back to normal. Based on a tiered 
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response and notification matrix, it is important to identify and prioritize mission-
essential functions and personnel. Additional consideration should be directed toward 
equipment identification, storage, protection, and availability for use at remote sites and 
regional locations. An inventory and maintenance process should capture the vital 
records, materiel, training, and databases required and created. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter, a summary of the important elements, limitations in research, 
and suggestions for future work are discussed as they relate to the concept of operations 
for CBRN wireless sensor detection within the LAFD. Wireless technology helps to 
address the CBRN threat by being able to identify hazards early, more accurately, and 
with fewer resources. Moreover, this technology will allow subject matter experts to view 
sensor data and “weigh in” on the potential threat and environmental conditions and to 
make informative decisions based on real-time information. Alerts and notifications can 
be sent using a variety of communication formats that will ensure that the proper 
personnel are contacted and informed.  
The research focused on establishing a concept of operations document for the 
LAFD’s hazardous-materials program that addresses the integration, implementation, and 
deployment of a CBRN wireless sensor network. However, the research goes further than 
the LAFD’s HazMat program. Based on the data analyzed, the concept extends beyond a 
particular wireless sensor platform or system. The essence of this research was to 
understand the technology involved, along with the tactical and operational capabilities to 
determine the feasibility and value. The end result is that the LAFD will benefit from this 
type of system because the technology will facilitate timely, accurate information flow to 
command staff and subject matter experts, allowing better decisions. 
The material examined did not focus on hardware-related problems, software 
failures, or testing criteria. The idea was to concentrate on the possibilities and necessary 
elements critical to the development of a ConOps document for CBRN wireless 
detection, rather than specific design and equipment features. A ConOps document is 
extremely important for HazMat specialists to properly deploy and respond to detection 
alarms. A ConOps forms the basis for integrating wireless detection capability into the 
LAFD’s hazardous-materials operations, taking key information into account. The 
detection capabilities are a vital element of the ConOps and should address specific TICs, 
TIMs, and CWA agents.  
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The CBRN wireless detection architecture is very important when designing and 
implementing an effective protection capability for the fire service. Many factors need to 
be weighed, such as risk assessment, performance standards, communication protocols, 
and detection technologies. However, the ConOps aspects focus more acutely on the 
capability and operational aspects, leaving the technical data for future projects. The 
components are an important consideration, although detailed specific information was 
not necessary for the operational ConOps. The research focused on the practical 
application of WSNs for locations and events that present a target to terrorists, such as 
sporting events, high-profile entertainment venues, and mass-gathering sites. The 
technical aspects were not discussed or researched; concentration was given instead to the 
possibilities and practical homeland security applications. This approach addresses the 
possible aspects, intended use, and agency participation.  
The future of hazardous-material detection lies within technological solutions 
such as wireless sensor networks. Ultimately, wireless sensors will become more 
common and will provide for greater public safety as this technology continues to evolve 
and take shape within the homeland security architecture. The integration of WSN into 
hazardous-materials operations will enable stakeholders and other fire service 
organizations to obtain critical environmental data quickly and to provide a system to 
share that information across all disciplines. Agencies may choose to collaborate, to share 
information about new technology developments, to achieve the benefits of joint 
purchasing, to share information processing or business process services, or to develop 
new technologies for supporting interaction and interoperability among their participating 
organizations (Williams et al., 2009). Fire, police, and health agencies have recognized 
the value of this technology and are moving forward to incorporate wireless applications 
to detect and respond to a variety of threats and hazards.  
The implementation of the proposed CBRN wireless sensor network may have 
wide-ranging impacts for the Los Angeles Fire Department, regional fire departments, 
and allied agencies with hazardous-materials response capability. It is anticipated that the 
LAFD will have to adapt the changes to the way that HazMat operations are conducted in 
order to achieve the agency’s mission, goals, and objectives in CBRN detection. The 
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CBRN wireless sensor network will help facilitate these changes by demonstrating a 
safer, quicker, and more reliable response posture. The LAFD has been responsive to the 
need to integrate wireless technology into its detection capabilities, and it accepts the 
challenge by revising the department’s HazMat processes to include conceptual CBRN 
modeling and architecture. The integration of a wireless sensor detection system will 
provide decision support for IC management for CBRN incidents.  
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